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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon the Su-
preme Court of the State of Utah by virtue of Article VIII, Section 
4 of the Utah Constitution; 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated; and Rule 
3(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, acting 
pursuant to Rule 4A Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, transferred 
this appeal to the Court of Appeals by order dated September 12, 
1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff and defendants have all appealed from those 
portions of the district court judgment which were adverse to them. 
Plaintiff has appealed from that portion of the district court 
judgment which quashed the foreign (Washington State) judgment as 
to six of the ten named defendants (plaintiff apparently actually 
only challenges the judgment as to three of the six), and defend-
ants have appealed that portion of the judgment which upheld the 
foreign judgment as to four of the ten named defendants. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff's appeal raises the following issues for 
revi ew: 
1. Whether the district court properly allowed the def-
endants to collaterally attack the Washington State judgment on the 
basis of insufficiency of process and lack of jurisdiction over the 
defendants; 
1 
2. Whether the district court erred in concluding that 
process had not been validly served upon the defendants Schuckardt, 
Jacobs and Belzak (plaintiff has not questioned the judgment as to 
Mangold and Kosch or, apparently, Our Lady of Marienfried Catholic 
Church). 
The defendants1 appeal raises the following issues for 
revi ew: 
1. Whether the district court erred in concluding that 
process had been validly served upon the four defendants Gabriel 
Gorbet, Terry Horwath, Courtney Krier and Vladimiar Boridin. 
DETEBMINITIVE STATUTES, RULES, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
(Set out verbatin in the addendum) 
1. Article IV, Section 1, United States Constitution 
(Full Faith and Credit). 
2. 4.28.080(14) Washington Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Service of Process). 
3. 78-22a-l, et. Seq., Utah Code Annotated (Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in District Court. 
Plaintiff sought to register a default judgment from the 
State of Washington. Defendants moved to quash the plaintiff!s 
Notice of Judgment (purportedly served pursuant to the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act) and for an order vacating and setting aside the 
Washington judgment on the grounds of (1) insufficiency of process 
and lack of jurisdiction over the defendants in the Washington 
acti on, 
2 
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corporation sole) was founded by Bishop Schuckardt in 1965 (Tr . 9). 
The corporation owned (and apparently still owns) two parcels of 
improved real property located in Spokane, Washington i.e., a form-
er Jesuit seminary known as Mount St. Michael Ts Seminary and a 
residence, for Bishop Schuckardt and others, known as the Priory 
(Tr. 11, 12, 15). 
The Church1 s congregation was comprised of a layer of ec-
clesiastical management (the Bishop being the superior general), 
i.e., priests, clerks and religious brothers (some of whom lived at 
the Seminary and some of whom lived at the Priory) and the lay mem-
bers of the Church (Tr. 14, 15). Each of the defendant-respondents 
was a member of the ecclesiastical managment of the Church. Until 
June 3, 1984, Bishop Schuckardt and respondents Jacobs, Belzak, 
Gorbet and Horwath had maintained their residence at the Priory for 
two to four years (Tr. 16-18, 53, 54, 155, 157). 
Defendant Michael Mangold was a long time resident 
(several years) and teacher at the Seminary and came occasionaly 
and on weekends to the Priory to perform clerical duties (Tr. 19, 
20, 129, 130). Mangold arrived at the Priory on June 1, after 
teaching his class at the Seminary, for his regular weekend duties 
and took up "residence" in the guest house (Tr. 130). Defendants 
Raymond Kosch, Courtney Krier and Vladimiar Boridin were also 
regularly domiciled at the Seminary (Tr. 21). On occasion, as 
their duties demanded, Mangold, Kosch, Krier and Boridin would stay 
in the guest house in back of the Priory when called to the Priory 
to perform various duties assigned to them by the Bishop (Tr. 23, 
129). 
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Priory to ally himself with Bishop Sehuckardt (Tr. 23). Fearing 
for their physical safety, defendants Sehuckardt, Jacobs, Belzak 
and Horwath left the Priory and took up residence at the Jefferson 
House Hotel in Spokane (Tr. 32, 33, 41, 42, 55, 82, 83, 117, 132, 
156, 157, 166, 170, 188, 190, 191). None of them had any intention 
of returning to the Priory (Tr. 33, 158) and, in fact, never did, 
except for Jacobs, Horwath and Belzak, who returned a number of 
times between June 3, and June 7, for short periods of time to 
assist with the packing and moving of the BishopTs possessions (Tr. 
166). Terry Horwath was present at the Priory on June 8, to assist 
in last minute packing and moving (Tr. 118). During the interim 
between June 3, and June 8, various members of the congregation who 
had remained loyal to the Bishop assisted in packing and moving the 
belongings of the Bishop from the Priory (Tr. 36, 37, 54, 55, 77, 
84, 107, 118, 132, 151, 152, 166). On June 5, the parents of 
Gabriel Gorbet offered the respondents a place to stay in Cali-
fornia, which offer was accepted by the Bishop on behalf of all of 
the respondents (Tr. 37-39, 77, 124, 132, 153, 158, 167). 
During the packing and move, those at the Priory were 
continually subjected to harrassment and intimidation by the 
Chicoine faction. Such incidents included the theft of a Church 
van loaded with Church property in a violent manner (Tr. 33, 35, 
36, 68, 69, 87, 88), slashing of tires (Tr. 88), congregating at 
the front gate (Tr. 35, 73, 75), and harrassing those within 
through the intercom (Tr. 163). 
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On June 7, plaintiff filed its complaint in Spokane Coun-
ty. Plaintiffs in that action were the Tridentine Latin Rite Cath-
olic Church of Saint Joseph, Dennis Chicoine and Thomas Drahman 
(Exhibits P-2 and 3). On the evening of June 7, Thomas Drahman and 
Dennis Chicoine (joint plaintiffs in the Washington action) came to 
the Priory and attempted (unsuccessfully) to serve the summons and 
complaint themselves upon defendants Jacobs and Horwath by deliver-
ing them in a briefcase containing medications for the Bishop (Tr . 
170, 177). Having failed in the attempt, they enlisted the help of 
the Spokane County Sheriff. 
Deputy Ellis received the process on the afternoon of 
June 8 (Tr. 103), made an attempt to serve the Bishop and Terry 
Horwath at a motel located at CavanaughTs Park where it had been 
reported they were living (Tr. 103, 104), and then, accompanied by 
two memebers of the Chicoine faction (Pivarunas and Drahman) and a 
Spokane City police officer, went to the Priory to attempt service 
of process (Tr. 95, 96). As they moved up the driveway toward the 
house, Deputy Ellis observed that there "were people moving around" 
back and forth between the house and a rental truck parked in the 
driveway (Tr. 97). As they approached the house Pivarunas "men-
tioned that there was one of the subjects there, Terry Horwath" 
(Tr. 97). Deputy Ellis did not know which of the individuals had 
been identified as Terry Horwath, did not verify from any of the 
members of the group that Terry Horwath was in the group, and could 
not describe Terry Horwath (Tr. 98, 106, 107). In fact, the deputy 
acknowledged that Mr. Horwath could have been any one of the people 
7 
in the group and he had no knowledge of which one was Horwath (Tr . 
108). 
As they approached the house, the individuals in the 
driveway recognized Drahman and Pivarunas (Tr. 79). Because of the 
defendants1 well grounded fear of violence on the part of the 
plaintiffs, those members of the community that had remained loyal 
to the Bishop had been instructed by the Bishop to go into the house 
if confronted by them (Tr. 34, 72, 118). Accordingly, they did so 
(Tr. 80, 120). Deputy Ellis approached the door, and without ever 
identifying anyone at the door or determining which was Horwath, 
identified himself as a deputy sheriff (Tr. 98) and stated that he 
was there "for the purpose of serving civil papers" (Tr. 98) and/or 
TT T
 I have some civil papers with regards to Mount Saint MichaelsT or 
words to that effect" (Tr. 109). Deputy Ellis never asked for, nor 
personally identified, Terry Horwath or any of the other named 
defendants, had no knowledge of his own as to which, if any, of the 
defendants resided at the Priory, made no attempt to determine if, 
in fact, any of them actually lived there, and relied solely upon 
the information he had received from his office (which included the 
fact that Bishop Schuckardt and Terry Horwath may be living else-
where). See Tr. 102-106. At no time did Deputy Ellis inform the 
defendants, or anyone at the door, that he had a summons or 
complaint, what the nature of the "civil papers" were, or attempt 
to hand them to anybody at the door (Tr. 99, 123). It was only 
after the door had been closed that he dropped the papers on the 
doorstep (Tr. 98,99, 100) and announced in a normal (Tr. Ill) voice 
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"audible that the people around (him) would be able to hear" that 
he had completed his purpose and that they had been served (Tr. 
100). Deputy Ellis got no response from the defendants, or anyone, 
behind the closed door and he did not know if they could hear him or 
not (Tr. 100). The reader is invited to read the testimony of 
Deputy Ellis (reproduced in the addendum herein) in its entirety in 
order to fully understand the totally defective nature of the 
purported personal service upon Terry Horwath, and through him, the 
purported substituted service on the other defendants herein. 
Also, see Addendum "Nine" (time line of events) for further clari-
fication of the sequence of time and events involved. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Washington law requires that the sheriff diligently 
search and inquire to locate and serve the defendants personally 
before substitute abode service can be utilized. No such diligent 
search and inquiry was made. The purported substitute service, 
therefore, is void. 
2. Substitute service must comply strictly with the 
statute. Six of the defendants had abandoned their residence at 
the Priory and taken up temporary quarters at the Jefferson Street 
Hotel in Spokane while they had their belongings removed from the 
Priory for transport to California where they had determined to go. 
Terry Horwath (one of the six), upon whom service was purportedly 
made for all defendants, was not a resident of the Priory and, 
therefore, substitute service upon him was void. 
3. Attempted service (personal and substitute) upon 
Terry Horwath was fatally defective because the deputy sheriff 
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(a) did not ask for him, (b) could not identify him, (c) did not 
ask for any of the other named defendants, (d) did not determine 
whether any of the named defendants were present or resided there, 
(e) did not determine who any of those present at the door were, 
(f) did not inform anyone that he was serving a summons and 
complaint and (g) made no delivery or tender of the papers. 
4. The Full Faith and Credit clause of the United 
States Constitution does not require Utah to recognize a void 
Washington judgment. Utah may inquire into questions of juris-
diction, due process and etc. 
5. The tr ial court cor recti y quashed servi ce of summons as to 
the defendants Schuckardt, Jacobs, Belzak, Mangold and Kosch. 
Schuckardt, Jacobs and Belzak had moved from the Priory June 3, and 
taken up temporary res idence in the Jefferson House Hotel. On June 5, 
theyaccepted an offer to locate in Calif ornia. On the eveningof June 7, 
Mangold left for the ranch i n Cal i f ornia. The fact that the last of the 
moving trucks had left prior to purported ser vi ce , together wi th the fact 
thateveryonepresentonthe8thleftshortlyafter the attempted service 
by the sher i f f on the 8th, is cor roborat i ng evi dence of the i ntent of the 
defendants to change their place of abode. 
6. The trial court erred when it failed to quash 
service as to all defendants because (a) the sheriff did not 
diligently search and inquire as to the whereabouts and possiblity 
of personal service upon defendants, (b) service upon Horwath was 
fatally defective for the reasons set forth in paragraph 3 above, 
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(c) Horwath and Boridin had already moved from the Priory (Horwath 
had located at the Jefferson Street Hotel, and Boridin was on his 
way to California). 
7. Respondents incorporate and adopt the arguments of 
co-respondent, Bro. John Francis Marie (Joseph Belzak). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BOTH WASHINGTON STATE LAW AND MINIMUM DUE PROCESS STANDARDS 
REQUIRE "DUE DILIGENCE" IN ATTEMPTING PERSONAL SERVICE 
BEFORE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE MAY BE EMPLOYED 
1. Diligent Search and Inquiry Required, 
The Washington Code of Civil Procedure, Section 4.28.080 
sets forth various means for effecting service of summons upon 
cities, towns, corporations, minors and etc., and then provides 
that the summons shall be delivered "(14) In all other cases, to 
the defendant personally, or by leaving a copy of the summons at 
the house of his usual abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion then resident therein." This statute seems to permit 
personal service to be effected either by leaving a copy with the 
defendant directly, or effecting "abode" service, at the option of 
the plaintiff. Notwithstanding the literal language of the 
statute, however, the Washington court has construed "abode" ser-
vice to be substituted service, and not personal service. See 
Dolan vs. Baldridge (Wash. 1931), 4 P.2d. 871, wherein the court, 
construing the identical provision of the then extant Rem. Comp. 
Stat. Sec. 226, said that summons left at the former residence 
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while the wife was there for the purpose of removing household 
goods to their new residence did not constitute effective "substi-
tuted service" upon the husband. Consistent with this position is 
the wording on the sheriff's returns (Exhibit P-l, Addendum 3) 
which designates "abode" service as substituted service. 
To construe abode service as substituted service is in 
harmony with the general rule. See 62 Am. Jur. 2d., Process Sec. 
38, page 820, wherein the author states: 
"Broadly speaking, there are two methods of service 
of original process in civil actions. One is actual or 
personal service, as by reading the original process to 
the defendant, or delivering a copy of it to him, and the 
other is substituted or constructive service, as by 
leaving a copy of the process with some third person at 
the defendant's residence when he is absent . . ." 
See also page 822 wherein the author states that "The 
term 'personal service' ordinarilly does not include service by 
leaving a copy at the place of residence or abode." 
It is evident from the testimony of the serving officer, 
Deputy Ellis, that his returns of service reciting "di1igent search 
and inquiry" are false. Each of the nine Sheriff's Returns of 
Service signed by Deputy Ellis (Exhibit P-l) recite as follows: 
"I, Larry V. Erickson, Sheriff in and for said 
County and State, do hereby certify that I received the 
annexed (papers to be served) on the 8th day of June, 
1984, and that I served the same on the 8th day of June, 
1984, at the hour of 6:10 p.m. within the County of 
Spokane, State of Washington as follows: 
"SUBSTITUTE: After diligent search and inquiry, was 
unable to find (name of defendant served), I served by 
delivering to and leaving with Terry Horwath, resident, 
personally, a person of suitable age and discretion, then 
resident therein at the house and usual abode of said 
(name of person served) . . . a copy of said (papers to be 
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served)." (See Addendum 3 for sample of full copy of 
return). 
An examination of the testimony of Deputy Ellis 
clearly shows that he did not make any such diligent search 
and inquiry. In fact, he made only a superficial effort to 
locate Bishop Schuckardt and no attempt at all to locate any 
of the other named defendants. Observe the following colloquy 
between counsel for the defendants and Deputy Ellis: 
(Tr. 102) 
fTQ. What did you do to diligently search and in-
quire about the whereabouts of the other defendants? 
A. When we receive civil papers it is up to the 
parties bringing the papers to us to give us an 
address or work address or place where they may be 
found. This address was given to me as listed on 
our day sheet. That was the address I went to. The 
parties were there. As I learned later, with the 
problems that was there it wasn't beneficial for me 
to require ID of every person, or whatever, which in 
a civil case we cannot be compelled to make a person 
show their ID. 
Q. I think my question is what did you do? 
A. To go to that residence and that was all. 
Q. You didn't attempt in any way then to find out 
who actually resided or lived at that location? 
A. I did not, no. . . . 
Q. The Returns of Service were made pursuant to 
your directions as to what you had done, were they 
not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you received the papers approximately what 
time during the day? 
A. I don't know; that day, that afternoon, maybe. 
Q. And you went to the Altamont residence; you 
didn't go anywhere else before that? 
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A. There was an address of CavanaughTs Interpark, 
which was a motel that I went to. 
Q. And what was the purpose for going there? 
A. My officer told me that he may be staying there. 
Q. (Who) would be staying there? 
A. Father Mathias or Father Schuckardt. 
Q. Bishop Schuckardt? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who told you he may be staying there? 
A. Our office. I work in the patrol car. I have a 
radio, and our office goes through our dispatch to 
give me messages or whatever. . . 
Q. What did you find when you went to the motel? 
A. He was not there. 
Q. Did you make any other attempt to locate any 
other defendant other than to just go the Altamont 
res i dence? 
A. No." 
Ten lines further on in the transcript of testimony (Tr 
105), defendants1 attorney asked the following: 
Q. Okay. Did you have any knowledge of your own as 
to whether any of the defendants named actually 
lived at that residence? 
A. No. 
Q. What did you rely on? 
A. The people that sent the papers to our office. 
Q. The plaintiffs themselves? 
A. They supplied us with an address, and with that 
information they give it to us and we go with the 
information thatTs given to us. 
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Twenty one lines further on in the transcript of testi-
mony (Tr. 106), defendants1 attorney asked: 
"Q. Did you make any attempt to verify whether any 
of them lived at that address? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see any defendants other than Terry 
Horwath or Frater Mathias, the same individual here; 
did you see any other people there that you could 
identify as a defendant in this action? 
A. No. 
Q. Was anyone else pointed out to you as being a defend-
ant in the action? 
A. He was the only one that was pointed out. 
Q. Can you describe Terry Horwath. 
A- No. 
Q. Did he identify himself to you as bei ng Terr y Horwath 
or Frater Mathias? 
A. I donTt believe so." 
Clearly, then, Deputy Ellis did not make any "diligent 
search and inquiry" as required by the law of the State of 
Washington before substituted service could be effected. 
2. Notice Must be Reasonably Calculated to Apprise Defendants of 
Pending Action. 
The reader's attention is directed to the case of Thayer 
vs. Edmonds (Wash. 1976), 8 Wash. App. 36, which states that "Of 
course notice reasonably calculated under all of the circumstances 
to apprise interested parties of a pending action is a matter of 
consitutional due process." The Court cited the case of Mullane 
vs. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company (1950), 339 U.S. 306, 94 
L.Ed. 865, 70 S.Ct. 199 as follows: 
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"When notice is a person1 s due, process which is a mere 
gesture is not due process. The means employed must be 
such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee 
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reason-
ableness, and hence the cont i tut i onal validity of any 
chosen method, may be defended on the ground that it is, 
in itself, reasonably certain to inform those affected, . 
. . Exceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away 
the rule that, within the limits of practicability, 
notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach 
interested parti es." 
28 Fed. Proc, L.Ed., Section 65:58 puts it this 
way: 
"Due process requires that notice be reasonably 
calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise inter-
ested parties of the pendency of an action and to afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections. . . 
Process which is a mere gesture is not due process, and 
the means employed in serving process must be such as one 
desireous of actually informing the absentee might 
reasonably adopt to accomplish this purpose." 
The method of service most likely to inform the defend-
ants of the nature and existence of a lawsuit against them is to 
place a copy of the summons and complaint in the hand of each 
defendant. It would logically follow that the "limits of practic-
ability" referred to inMullane are not reached until such personal 
service has at least been at tempted, unless plaintiff is aware of 
special circumstances which make such attempts at personal service 
futile. 
3. Honest & Reasonable Effort to Personally Serve Defendants 
Required. 
Three Washington cases of which the writer is aware are 
instructive on this point. In each case, substituted service by 
publication was purportedly effected, and judgment was rendered 
against the defendants so served. In each case, the defendant, or 
16 
defendants, later moved to vacate the judgment on the ground of 
insufficient service of summons. In each case, the appellate court 
reversed the trial court and set aside the judgment, holding that 
the plaintifffs failure to make a suff icient effort to locate and 
personally serve the defendants rendered the substituted service by 
publication void and that substituted service by publication may 
not be effected on the ground that the defendant cannot be found 
unless the plaintiff has made an honest and reasonable effort to 
locate the defendant. See Painter vs. Olney (1984), 37 Wash. App. 
424, 680 P.2d. 1066; Schmelling vs. Hoffman (1920), 111 Wash. 408; 
Olson vs. Johns (1909), 56 Wash. 12. 
In the present case, there was no "notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of a pending action" as required by Thayer vs. Edmonds, 
supra, 8 Wash. App. 36. In fact, the testimony of the plaintiff's 
witnesses as well as the defendants, raises a reasonable suspicion 
that a deliberate attempt was made not to inform the defendants 
that a law suit had been commenced against them. That suspicion is 
fortified by the fact that plaintiffTs business manager, Thomas 
Drahman, actually knew that Bishop Schuckardt was no longer living 
at the Priory (Tr. 190, 191), and by the apparently deliberate 
failure of the plaintiff to send notice of the docketing of the 
foreign judgment in this (Utah) action to the proper and known 
address or addresses of the defendants (Tr. 142, 147, R-2, 3 
[affidavit of Jamie Swenson] , R-12-14 [Notice of Judgment] see 
Addendum 4). 
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The sheriff's return stating that the defendants in this 
case (except for Terry Horwath) could not be found after diligent 
search and inquiry (Exhibit P-l, Addendum 3), is frankly false. He 
made no such search and inquiry, diligent or otherwise. The 
testimony of all witnesses (including the deputy sheriff) make it 
clear that plaintiffTs agents knew that Bishop Schuckardt (and 
perhaps others of the defendants) were not living at the South 
Altamont residence (the Priory) at the time summons was purportedly 
served upon them on June 8, 1984 (Tr. 102-104, 190, 191, 202, 204, 
208), and that no effort was made to find out whether anyone lived 
at the Priory or elsewhere (Tr. 102-112). Plaintiff simply enlist-
ed the assistance of a sheriffTs deputy to go with them to the 
BishopTs former residence where substituted service was purportedly 
effected upon Terry Horwath (whom the sheriff could not distinguish 
from the others at the door, Tr. 108) by dropping a pile of summons 
and complaints on the doorstep. 
POINT II 
ABODE SERVICE REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS 
OF WASHINGTON CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 4.28.080 (14) 
WHICH REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT MET IN THIS CASE. 
Perhaps because substituted service is permitted, at least 
on the face of the Washington State statute, as an alternative to 
personal service, Washington case law has strictly construed the 
provisions of the "abode" service statute and required complete 
compliance with all of the elements thereof. An excellent case in 
point is Dolan vs. Baldridge (Supra, 1931), 165 Wash. 69, 4 P.2d. 
871. That Washington Supreme Court case involved facts 
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nearly identical to those before this court. In Dolan, husband and 
wife had resided in Spokane until the middle of April, 1930, at 
which time husband was notifed that he was being transferred to 
Seattle and was to move there as soon as possible. He made the move 
to Seattle on April 29, and notified his company of his presence in 
Seattle. On May 11, wife returned to Spokane after a short 
vacation and was packing furniture the following day, May 12, when 
she was personally served with a summons and complaint, as well as 
a summons and complaint purporting to effect subsituted service on 
her husband. The court found that: 
"The wife was not then residing at the Spokane 
residence. The husband had not been there since April 
27th when he departed from Spokane and established his 
headquarters in Seattle. Clearly the Spokane house, the 
former home of respondents, the place from which they 
were then removing their household goods, was not the 
house of their usual abode under the statute. 
"In its relation to the question 'whether a summons 
has been left at the house of his usual abode1 the quoted 
term means oneTs fixed place of residence for the time 
being, the place where defendant is actually living at 
the time, (emphasfs fn or igi nal ) and may be synonymous 
with 'residence.' But ordinarily Tusual place of abodeT 
is a much more restricted term than fresidence1 and means 
the place where the defendant is actually living at the 
time when service is made. Service at the dwelling house 
of defendant, which is not described as his usual place 
of abode, is not sufficient. The purpose of the use of 
the term in the act relating to the service of process 
has primary reference to the place where the defendant is 
usually to be found. Therefore, Tusual place of abodeT 
means Tpresent place of abode1" (Emphasis added). 
The court goes on to state that: 
"At the time substituted service upon the husband 
was attempted, Tthe house of his usual abodeT was in 
Seattle. There he was actually living. In that abode, 
his new home, his wife would soon join him with his 
household goods, which she was preparing for shipment at 
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the time service was attempted. The substituted service 
was not valid, as a copy of the summons was not left 'at 
the house of his usual abode1; hence, the court did not 
err in quashing the same upon motion of respondent hus-
band." 
For a further discussion of the requirement of strict 
compliance, see 62 Am. Jur. 2d.f Process Sec. 68, page 848, wherein 
the author states: 
"The procedure prescribed by the statute for con-
structive or substituted service must be strictly pursued 
in order that the judgment may be sustainable. Substi-
tuted service and service by publication were unknown to 
the common law but depend upon statutory authorization, 
and the principle of statutory construction that there 
must be strict compliance with enactments modifying the 
course of common law in regard to legal proceedings is 
exemplified in the cases involving the construction and 
applications of provisions authorizing substituted and 
constructive service." 
Plaintiff herein, having failed to serve the summons at 
the defendants1 "present place of abode", i.e. where they were 
"actually living at the time" further failed to comply with the 
Washington statute requiring that the summons and complaint be left 
It is significant to note in the Dolan case that absent 
strict compliance with the "abode" service requirements, the possi-
bility of actual knowledge of the summons and complaint did not 
seem to be an issue. In Dolan, it is obvious that the husband had 
actual knowledge of the proceedings since, shortly after the at-
tempted substituted service, he appeared specially for the purpose 
of moving to quash the service. Actual receipt of the summons and 
complaint was not even discussed as an issue relating to whether 
service had been effected. Those factual circumstances make the 
instant case even more compelling, since none of the defendants 
received actual notice of the proceedings as a result of the 
attempted substituted service. (For further discussion on the 
effect of actual notice, see 62 Am. Jur. 2d., Process Sec. 68, page 
849, and the cases there cited supporting the proposition that "The 
fact that the defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service 
does not render the service effectual if in fact the process was 
not served in accordance with the requirements of statute.") 
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"with some person of suitable age and discretion then resident 
therein". As discussed elsewhere herein, none of the defendants, 
including those who were physically present on the property at the 
time of purported service (with the possible exception of Gorbet 
and Krier), were actually living there, and simply dropping the 
sunrnons and complaints on the daorstep, without identifying the 
person served, asking for any of the named defendants, informing 
the defendants that the sheriff had a summons and complaint for 
service or attempting to tender or deliver them to anyone (See 
Point III herein for details), certainly does not constitute "leav-
ing" them with someone of suitable age and discretion. 
The testimony of all the witnesses was to the effect that 
the defendants who were physically present at the Priory at the 
time service was attempted, retreated back into the house (Priory) 
and closed the door when they saw agents of the plaintiff approach-
ing the property (Tr. 80, 120). Such was certainly not unreason-
able behavior on their part. The defendants had been warned by the 
Spokane police that they should vacate the Priory because of 
ongoing friction between the factions within the Church, and the 
threat of physical violence (Tr. 164), tires had been slashed (Tr . 
88), the Church van stolen (Tr. 87, 88), defendants tailed (Tr. 
164) and harrassed (Tr. 163). Members of the Chicoine faction were 
known to carry guns (Tr. 65, 67). It is certainly understandable 
that they would place a locked door between themselves and an 
approaching contingent of the Chicoine faction of the church. 
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Having failed to meet the requirements of the statute in 
any particular, the purported substituted service was invalid for 
any purpose and failed to confer personal jurisdication upon any of 
the defendants so served. In the case of Mid-City Materials, Inc. 
vs. Heater Beaters Custom Fireplaces (Wash. 1984), 674 P.2d. 1271, 
summons was served upon defendants at their son's residence. De-
fendants did not reside with the son and the Washington court held 
that such attempted substituted service did not confer in personum 
jurisdiction over the defendants and was invalid for any purpose. 
So also in this case, the attempted abode service on defendants is 
invalid for any purpose. 
POINT III 
ATTEMPTED SERVICE UPON TERRY HORWATH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE 
1. Horwath Simply One of the Group 
The schism between the two factions of the church had 
fully developed by June 3, 1984, when Terry Horwath removed his 
abode from, and vacated, the Priory on South Altamont Blvd. and 
moved to the Jefferson House Hotel along with Bishop Schuckardt, 
Joseph Belzak and Andrew Jacobs (Tr. 32). On a few occasions, 
including June 8, he returned to the Priory to pack (Tr. 36, 37). 
On a number of those occasions, police officers came to the door 
and advised those within to pack and leave as soon as possible, 
inasmuch as they (the police) feared conflict between those at the 
Priory and the Chicoine faction (Tr. 36, 73). The rebels had come 
through the woods in back of the Priory and stolen a Church van and 
had harrassed those within from the street (Tr. 35, 73, 75). The 
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atmosphere of tension was sufficient to induce the Spokane City 
Police to patrol the area (Tr. 75) • 
On Friday, June 8, 1984, at 6:10 p.m., Deputy Ellis in 
company with two of the rebellious priests came up the driveway 
(Tr. 78, 95, 9 6 ) v Fearing more conflict, those individuals in the 
yard retreated to the house and after a brief discussion with the 
sheriff at the door, closed the door (Tr. 80, 82, 120). Deputy 
Ellis never told anyone that he was there to serve summons and 
complaint, never asked for nor identified Terry Horwath indi-
vidually, never asked for any of the other named defendants, and 
never actually attempted to deliver the summons and complaint to 
anyone (Tr. 92-112). Deputy Ellis describing the scene stated that 
as he walked up the driveway Mr. Pivarunas pointed out Terry 
Horwath as being among a number of individuals outside the building 
and went on to say (Tr. 107, 108): 
TTQ. . . . was he isolated and by himself when he 
was pointed out or was he with other members of the 
group? 
A. They were all in the same general area. Whether 
he was standing off alone or not, I don't remember. 
Q. How were you able to distinguish which indi-
vidual it was that Mr. Pivarunas was identifying as 
Terry Horwath? 
A. He pointed him out to me, and when we went up to 
the steps he was there at the door. But he never 
acknowledged to me --. 
Q. Did he say say: 'He's the third man from the 
right, or hefs the one in the middle, HeTs the short 
one, or he's the one with moustache1, or how could 
you tell which individual he had reference to? 
A. He was in that group of people that were at the 
door . 
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Q. So i t could have been anyone of the group of 
people that was Terry Horwath. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in that group of people was one of the 
individuals that was pointed out as Terry Horwath? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you donT t know which one it was? 
A. No." 
The first and most obvious defect in this purported 
service is the fact that the sheriff had no idea who he was serving. 
He did not ask for Horwath or anyone else. He had no independent 
knowledge of the identity of Terry Horwath, could not describe him 
and could not pick him out from the crowd. Giving his testimony the 
benefit of the doubt, the most that can be said is that Terry 
Horwath had been identified by Mr. Pivarunas as a member of a group 
of people who retreated to the house at their approach. He did not 
know which of the group was Horwath, could not pick him out from the 
group at the time, and could not describe him in any particular at 
the trial (Tr. 106, lines 22 & 23). He had no idea which of the 
those present should be addressed, or to whom he should tender the 
papers. As discussed below, he actually made no tender of the 
papers to anyone. One is constrained to ask, however, had he done 
so, to whom would he have tendered them? 
2. No Delivery or Tender 
We now must now consider the fact that Deputy Ellis never 
actually tendered the papers to anyone. On direct examination he 
described the purported service as follows (Tr. 97): 
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Q. Would you tell the court in your own words what 
you did when you got out of your vehicle at that 
time? 
A. . . . Then we went up to the front porch where I 
confronted them at the front porch. And there were 
people standing around the inside of the door when 
the door was opened. I identified myself to them as 
a deputy sheriff, and also showed them my badge, my 
case badge I carry in my pocket which contains my 
badge and my ID card; that I was there for the 
purpose of serving civil papers. And Terry Horwath 
was pointed out and some words were exchanged. 
People conversed back with me. I donTt know exactly 
what they were saying. It was arumentative. They 
were upset. Words were exchanged, and I left the 
papers and walked away. 
Q. When you say you left the papers, did you 
physically give them to Mr. Horwath? 
A. No, the people who were at the door. I felt 
there was no reason for me to stand there and argue 
with them or converse with anyone. I stated my 
purpose for being there, my identity for being 
there. And one of the parties involved were identi-
fied tome by Father Pivarunas. I dropped the paper 
when he shut the door. I dropped the papers on the 
porch or stoop and walked away. 
Q. At what point was the door closed on you; was it 
after you had identified who you were: 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the purpose for which you were there? 
A. Because they made several comments back to me 
with regards to having a right to be there, and not 
having a warrant. I donTt remember the exact words, 
but they were challenging me why I was there and the 
right being there. 
Q. Did you ever tender the papers to them? 
A. I had the papers out and they shut the door, 
slammed the door. I left the papers and that was 
the end." 
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It is extremely difficult to demonstrate a negative or 
that something is not in the record or the testimony. However, a 
careful reading of Deputy EllisTs testimony in its entirety (to-
gether with the testimony of the defendants) reveals the fact that 
at no time did he actually deliver or even tender the papers to 
anyone (Tr. 82, 92-112, 120, 123, 181, 189). In fact, by his own 
testimony quoted above, he apparently "gave" the papers to al1 "the 
people who were at the door". He did not feel it necessary to 
"stand there and argue with them or to converse with anyone". No 
one ever retrieved the papers nor were they made aware that service 
of process had purportedly been made upon them. 
The Washington court has held that "Summons need not 
actually be placed in defendant's hand for service to be effected." 
See United Pacific Insurance Company vs. Discount Company, (Wash. 
1976), 550 P.2d. 699. In the United Pacific case the process 
server told the defendants agent that he had legal papers for her. 
She slammed the door, knocking the summons and complaint from his 
hand. He then told her loudly that she had been legally served. 
The court held that service had been effected: 
"The facts in the case at bench demonstrate a clear 
attempt by the process server to yield possession and 
control of the documents to Mrs. Norelius while he was 
positioned in a manner to accomplish that act. Normal 
Tdeliveryf thereof would have been effected upon Mrs. 
Norelius except for her obvious attempt to evade service 
by slamming the door after the papers had been held out 
to her. The summons need not actually be placed in the 
defendants hand. We find, as did the trial court, that 
facts in the record support a conclusion that TdeliveryT 
occured and service was effected." (Clear attempt to 
yield possession to identifiable defendant who slammed 
door after tender). 
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The Washington court has further stated (Hamill vs. 
Brooks, June 7, 1982, 646 P.2d. 151) that "Great care must be taken 
to insure that rules for service of process are followed; all 
reasonable steps must be taken to insure that defendant has been 
apprised of the action and told, in the summons, what to do about 
it." 
The Colorado court has held, in the case of Iwerks vs. 
People, (1954), 273 P.2d. 133 that: 
"Those charged with service of process must conform 
to the statute and service must be had on the interested 
party, and where grave doubt arises concerning what was 
actually done, doubt must be resolved in favor of person 
alleging that no service was made. (Emphasis added) 
(Doubt resolved in defendant's favor). 
"Statutory provisions are the measure of the power 
of the tribunal whose jurisdiction is questioned, and in 
the absence of a strict compliance therewith, court is 
without jurisdiction to act." (Strict complaince with 
statute or rule). 
The Minnesota court held, in the case of Nielsen vs. 
Braland (Minn. 1963), 110 N.W. 2d. 737, that where the defendant 
was in close proximity to a process server under such circumstances 
that a reasonable person would be convinced that personal service 
of sunmons was being attempted, the service would be complete even 
though the defendant refused to physically accept the summons. In 
that case, the process server actually touched Braland with the 
summons, told him what it was and laid it on the fender of an 
automobile nearby. Braland refused to pick it up. 
The uncontested evidence in this case shows that Terry 
Horwath was never apprised of the fact that legal papers were being 
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served upon him (as required by the Hamill court supra). In fact, 
he (and those with him at the time) had every reason to believe that 
the people they saw at the door were members of the Chicoine 
faction of the church (as indeed two of them were) and that 
conflict would surely arise if they confronted them. The door was 
closed without any knowledge on the part of anyone there (much less 
Terry Horwath) that there was a sheriff at the door to serve 
process. No papers were offered to him (United Pacific Insurance -
Supra), nor was he told that he was being served with legal process 
(Nielsen vs. Braland - Supra). There was no clear attempt by the 
sheriff to yield possession and control of the documents while he 
was positioned in a manner to accomplish the act, nor was Terry 
Horwath in close proximity to an identifiable process server under 
circumstances that a reasonable person would be convinced that 
personal service of summons was being attempted (as was the case in 
United Pacific Insurance supra). 
Under the circumstance, plaintiff cannot show that all 
(or even any) reasonable steps had been taken to insure that the 
defendant had been apprised of the action and told what to do about 
it, as required by the Hamill court (supra). There is no factual 
basis in the sheriff's affidavit to support his assertion that 
defendant Horwath (or any of them) was served. Any doubt in the 
mind of the Court under these circumstances, must be resolved in 
defendants favor (See Iwerks vs. People, supra). 
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POINT IV 
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS IS A DEFENSE 
TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE WASHINGTON JUDGMENT IN UTAH 
The Utah court is not required to recognize a foreign 
judgment where the court rendering the judgment was without juris-
diction over the defendants. The Utah court reconfirmed that prin-
ciple in the recent case of Data Management Systems, Inc., vs. EDP 
Corporation (Utah 1985), 709 P.2d. 377. In the Data Management 
case, the court held in headnotes 1, 2 and 3 as follows: 
"Credit which must be given to a judgment of a 
sister state does not prevent a judgment debtor from 
collaterally attacking a foreign judgment on ground of 
fraud or want of jurisdiction or due process. 
"A foreign judgment rendered without jurisdiction 
over the judgment debtor in the circumstances which 
amount to a lack of due process is not entitled to full 
fai th and credi t. 
"A court faced with a request to extend credit to a 
judgment of a sister state may inquire into the juris-
dictional basis of the foreign judgment . . .TT 
More explicitly the court said: 
"The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent a 
judgment debtor from collaterally attacking a foreign 
judgment on the ground of fraud or the want of 
jurisdiction or due process of law. Hobelman Motors 
Creamery, Inc. vs. Western Frozen Products Co., 14 Utah 
2d. 63, 465 P.2d. 544 (1970). A foreign judgment 
rendered without jurisdiction over the defendant or under 
circumstances which amount to lack of due process is not 
entitled to full faith and credit in Utah. 
As stated in 47 Am. Jur. 2d., Judgments Sec. 1254, page 251, 
". . . the jurisdiction of a court rendering a judgment is open to 
inquiry under the proper averments, when questioned in the court of 
another state. The party against whom the judgment is rendered is 
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not forced to go to the state of rendition of the judgment for 
relief." The California court expressly held in the case of 
DeRasmo vs. Smith (1971), 15 Ca. 3rd. 601 (footnote 6) that " . . . a 
void judgment may be attacked anywhere it presents itself . . .,f 
There is nothing in the Utah Foreign Judgment Act (78-22a-l, et. 
seq.) which would, in any way, modify the foregoing principles. In 
fact, the Act (78-22a-2 (2), Utah Code Annotated) provides that "A 
judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect and is 
subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for 
reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying, as a judgment of a 
district court of this state . . ." 
Defendants must be allowed to challenge the jurisdiction 
of the Washington court in Utah if the concepts expounded above and 
in Pennoyer vs. Neff (1877), 95 US 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 are to have any 
meaning. In that case (Pennoyer vs. Neff) the United States 
Supreme Court said: 
[T]he Act [is] applicable only when the court 
rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the parties 
and of the subject-matter, and not to preclude an inquiry 
into the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment 
was rendered." 
PlaintiffTs argument that the defendants must challenge 
the jurisdiction of the Washington court directly by answer or 
motion filed before judgment is obviously erroneous, is contrary to 
the principles ennunciated above, and, as so ably pointed out in 
the brief of co-respondent John Francis Marie (Joseph Belzak) is 
based upon an erroneous reading of the case of Raymond vs. Flem-
ing, 24 Wash. App. 112, 600 P.2d. 614. Clearly the district court 
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was well within its rights, and was, in fact, obi i gated to hear and 
decide defendantsT motion to quash, 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY QUASHED SERVICE AS TO THE DEFENDANTS 
SCHUCKARDT, JACOBS, BELZAK, MANGOLD <5c KOSCH 
Co-respondent, Bro. John Francis Marie, has cogently and 
ably expounded the principles involved in determining ones usual 
place of abode, and the writer incorporates herein co-respondent's 
Eighth Argument and urges the reader to study it carefully. In 
addition, respondents herein note that the uncontradicted testimony 
was that the named defendants had left the Priory on June 3, 1984, 
with no intention of returning, and took up temporary residence at 
the Jefferson House Hotel in Spokane. (See references to tran-
script on page 6 of the Statement of Material Facts supra). 
Defendants had been offered a place to stay in California as early 
as June 5, which offer had been accepted by Bishop Schuckardt on 
behalf of all defendants. (See references to transcript on page 6 
of the Statement of Material Facts, supra). In addition, Boridin, 
Mangold and Kosch left Spokane for California on the 7th in company 
with four of the nuns (Tr. 133). 
Plaintiff, in its brief, argues that defendants must 
elicit some type of corroborating evidence (other than their own 
testimony) to support their intention to abandon their abode at the 
Priory (page 16 of plaintiff's brief). Defendants disagree for the 
reasons expounded in Bro. John Francis Marie's brief, but, assuming 
for the sake of argument that some such corroboration is necessary, 
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the fact that the defendants were packing and moving throughout the 
week between June 3 and June 8, together with the fact that all had 
left the Priory shortly after the purported service of summons on 
the 8th (Tr. 78), is more than adequate corroboration of their 
intent to establish a new place of abode in California. 
It requires no citation of authority to support the long-
standing principle that the appellate court will not reverse the 
trial court if there is any evidence upon which the court could 
reasonably base its decision. The trial court in this case had 
more than enough evidence upon which to conclude that the defend-
ants were no longer residents of the Priory on June 8, 1984. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO QUASH 
SERVICE AS TO GORBET, HORWATH, KRIER <5c BORIDIN 
For the reasons set forth in Points I, II and III above, 
the district court erred by not quashing service as to the said 
defendants. In addition, there was no substantial evidence upon 
which the court could have based its decision not to quash as to 
Horwath and Boridin. 
VLADIMIAR BORIDIN 
The uncontradicted testimony of Michael Mangold and Ray-
mond Kosch was that they left the Priory on the evening of June 7, 
in company with Vladimiar Boridin and four nuns for their new home 
in California (Tr. 133, 153, 154). Boridin was not present on the 
8th, and there is no way the court could have determined that he 
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still maintained his abode at the Priory on the 8th, when he had 
already left for his new abode in California. 
TERRY HORWATH 
Terry Horwath, on the other hand, had moved from the 
Priory on June 3, along with Bishop Schuckardt, and defendants 
Jacobs and Belzak, to take up residence at the Jefferson House 
Hotel in Spokane. (See references on page 6 of the Statement of 
Relevant Facts, supra). Although he was present doing last minute 
packing for the Bishop on the 8th when the summons was purportedly 
served, there is nothing in the record to contradict the testimony 
that he had moved from the Priory. The district court had to have 
based its determination that Terry Horwath was still residing at 
the Priory solely on the fact that he was present on the 8th. 
A determination the either Boridin or Horwath were resi-
dents of the Priory in the face of the uncontradicted evidence that 
they had both moved prior to the 8th, is an arbitrary and ca-
pri cious decis ion. 
POINT VII 
RESPONDENTS INCORPORATE ALL ARGUMENTS IN BRIEF OF CO-RESPONDENT 
The respondents herein affirmatively incorporate all of 
the arguments so ably set forth in the brief of co-respondent Bro. 
John Francis Marie (Joseph Belzak). 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court is not required to give any credence 
at all to a foreign judgment, except as required by the Full Faith 
and Credit clause of the United States Constitution. Under the 
principles laid down in Pennoyer vs. Neff, the Utah court can 
refuse to recognize the Washington judgment if it be determined 
that the court was without jurisdiction over the defendants. 
The court correctly quashed the judgment as to the de-
fendants Schuckardt, Jacobs, Belzak, Mangold and Kosch, having 
correctly concluded that they were not residents of the Priory on 
June 8, 1984, since Schuckardt, Jacobs and Belzak had moved there-
from on June 3, and defendants Mangold and Kosch had departed for 
their new residence in California on June 7. The court erred, 
however, in failing to quash as to defendants Horwath and Boridin. 
There is no evidence to support the finding of the district court 
that defendants Horwath and Boridin were residents on the 8th. In 
fact, the uncontradicted testimony is that Horwath had moved with 
the others on the 3rd, and that Boridin had left for California on 
the 7th. 
Purported substituted service upon any of the defendants 
is void for the reason that the sheriff did not make any attempt to 
serve them personally before making substituted service as required 
by Washington law. 
Service upon Terry Horwath (and therefore upon the other 
defendants) for any purpose is void for failure of the sheriff to 
do anything at all to identify defendants, determine their resi-
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dency r ; app* i s^ defendants that they weL« be. - .j 
served, 1 
Therein . r augment uf t v- district court should be 
affirmed a.- r-
 a^l defendants r> * A • Washinqton "judqmenl w.is 
- - -J L-; -i - : - a s 11) u i 1 (> t h e-1, d e 1. e n d -
.i ; a;, i . . ,a3e L ^ inancie^ ^;. • i -ii r . -~ions to quash as to all 
defendants. 
/ c — / 
ROBERT L. LORD 
Attorney f o i: D e £ e n d a n t s - P e s p o n d e n t s 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
- ^ ..*'*.* i j i..iU^  . ..- JULII day L : Ma... - . 4< T 
caused to h'-: mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid, f *-
of the foregoing Respondents1 Brief to John T. Anderson 
HASLAM & HATCHf attorneys for plr? >~^iff-appellant, ~" ^.~- 3road-
way.r 4 th Floor, Salt Lake City, 'ah 84101, and • r John 
Francis Marie, CMRI, respondent per, P.O. * :reen-
ville, California Q ^ * " 
Robert L. Lord 
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ADDENDUM ONE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
ARTICLE IV, SECTION 1 
(FULL FAITH AND CREDIT) 
MfASMINli'lON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
4.28.080(13) 
(SERVICE OF PROCESS) 
CONSHTI I in,' ,11' llih I'MILD STATES ART. IV 
ARTICLE IV 
Section 1. 
Full Faith and Credit shall, be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, 
Records and Proceedings shall be proved,, and the Effect thereof. 
4 .28 .080 . Summons, how served 
The summons shall be served by delivem 
follows: 
(14) In all other cases, to the defendant personally, or by leaving 
a copy of the summons at the house of his usual abode with some 
person of suitable age and discretion then resident therein. 
Service made in the modes provided in this section shall be taken 
and held to be personal service, 
Enacted by Laws 1893, ch. 127, § 7. Amended by Laws 1957, ch. 202, § 1; 
Laws 1967, ch. 11, § 1; Laws 1977, Excess., ch. 120, § 1, eff. May 31, 1977; 
Laws 1987, ch. 361, § 1. 
ADDENDUM TWO 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
UTAH FOREIGN JUDGEMENT A< "I' 
Section 
78-22a-l. 
78-22a-2. 
78-22a-3. 
78-22a~4. 
FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT 
S. 
Short title. 
Definition — Kihnfc • 
foreign judgments 
Notice of filing. 
i - 0 
i -6 
; 7 
-
Kiel i 
Opt ional yi 
Fees 
r
 ,-A - :,!;-. 
HI a i i re . 
••lerpretation. 
78-22a- mwt title. 
This chapter shall be knov 
ment Act." 
L1 oreign Judg-
H i s t o r v (' l9o,'it 78-22a-I, enacted b> i^. 
1983, • s : * ; • < 
merits. 
Filing and status of foreign jin<Jg-
(1) For purposes of this chapter, "foreign judgment" means any ju«ir:?m*:- » 
decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court; whose acts 
are entitled to full faith and credit in this state. 
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an ap-
propriate act of Congress or an appropriate act of Utah may be filed with the 
county clerk of any county in Utah. The clerk of the district court shall treat 
the foreign judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district court of Utah. 
A judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect and is subject to the 
same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting 
78-22a-; l j L* v. 
iu i 
T iL 
r and !:he 
(1) The judgment credits -JT attorne 
foreign judgment, shall file an affidavit with the clerk of th« i. 
stating the last known post-office address ^ the judt;meni inn 
judgment creditor. 
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and affidavit, the clerk of the 
district court shall notify the judgment debtor that the judgment has been 
filed. Notice shall be sent to the address stated in the affidavit. The clerk shall 
record the date the notice is mailed in the register of actions. The notice shall 
include the name and post-office address of the judgment creditor and the 
name and address of the judgment creditor's attorney, if any, 
(3) No execution or other process for the enforcement of a foreign judgment 
filed under this chapter may issue until 30 days after the judgment is filed. 
ALMJKNIMIM IHKKE 
SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SERVICE 
OFFICE Or . #E SHERIFF OF SPOKANE COUNTl, ,ASHlNuTw /U"« i O 
SHERIFFS RETURN ?iF SERVICETHDMASR.FALLOUIST 
SPtKANE COUNIY 
UJU .» N J. e4201445-2Cl£»* _ 
Sheriff'!! NO. '^••6381 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
COUNTY OF SPOKANE ) ^ * 
The Corporat ion o f the T r iden t i ne Lat IIi i I "rancis Schuckardt, Michael Mango! d 
R i t e "CathoTfc" Church o f Sa in fJosepRT"
 v 3 ~a7£7a~Tra7~Ph11 11 p JtaTteT" GabT t e r s e r tret 
Dennis Chicoine and Tom Drahman " a /k /a Bro. Isaac Jacques Mar ie , e t al 
I, LARRY V. ERICKSON, Sheriff In and for said County and State, do hereby certify that t received the 
annexed A f f i d a v i t o f Thomas A. "Drahman & Dennis Chjlcoine; Motion fo r Order to Show' 
Cause Why a Pre l iminary I n j unc t i on "SfioullTnot IssucTOrcfer Requfrfng"DeTerTdan"E?"to" 
_Appea r_ and Show Cause Why a Pre l im inary I n j unc t i on Should Not Issue; Summon^ ana 
Complaint for~~Damanes and I n j u n c t i o n 
on the 8 * h day of June
 | tg _ 8 4 _ . , and thai I w v o d thu same on tho 
8 t h
 clay of _ J u n e , 19 _ i i a t " . * " "'"J ,i «i ' ' . . 
Cou n t y o f S po Ian ©, S tat e o f Was h I n g t o n, as I o I i o w s; 
PERSONAL: By delivering to and leaving wltl i: _ 
the said _ _ personally, a copy of said 
SUBSTITU 1 E. i\ftor diligent search and inquiry, was unable to find Francis Schuckardt 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..,_„ , 1 served by delivering to and leaving with Terry Horwath, 
_ - -_JCi_lidj_lL- » personally, a person of suitable age and discretion, then resident 
therein at the house and usual abode ol 3a.d F_r_a_!!^ S c h u c k a r d t ' E" J 3 " S - A l t e r a n t B l v d . . 
•"„ . -—•—•—3pokane~WA———* 
a copy of said A f f i d a v i t o f Thomas_A. Drahman & Dennis Chicoine; Motion for_0rder to 
Show Cause Why a Pre l im inary I n j u n c t i o n Sfio'uTa riot'Tssue; OrdeFTteqlPfrfriQ Defendant 
tqjAppear and Show Cause Why a Pre l iminary I n j unc t i on Should Not Issue; Surmions and 
CoriipTaln"i~Tor Damages and I n j unc t i on " " — — • • — — 
BUSINESS, CORPORATION: On said _ . . _ . _ _ . _ 
ll'in .... of said . . . . _ _ 
acopy of wuil .„ ... ... . _ 
GARNISHMENT On said . . . . . 
liiimiuiiuu I itilonnJUiil bv deliver nr t*^
 v-
_ _ _ - . . . . - _ . - a s u 11 < 
ofsaidGarnishee CeIendant a' 
personally, a copy of sai :! ,l! Vi ft of Garnishment, four answer forms three stamped, adare^ec 
envelopes and $10,'00 as required Dy statute, 
Dated tr.ij ,, 11 tL day of J i i n e 
SHERIFF 'S FEES LARRY V. ERICKSON, Sheriff 
G pt >kan e C o i i n l \ , iV as h i n o t o n 
Mi leage _. 
ADDENDUM FOUR 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTICE OF JUDGMENT 
Jonn T. Anderson, Bar No. 0094 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7520 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE CORPORATION OF THE TRIDENTINE 
LATIN RITE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF 
SAINT JOSEPH, a Washington 
corporation, NOTICE OF j r -<ENT 
vs. 
FRANCIS SCHUCKARDT; MICHAEL 
MANGOLD a/k/a FRA. PHILLIP MA 
GABRIEL GORBET a/k/a BRO. ISAAC 
JACQUES MARIE; VLADIMIAR BORIDL> 
a/k/a BRO. LONGIUNS; COURTNEY 
KRIER a/k/a FRA. MATTHEW MARIE; 
RAYMOND KOSCH a/k/a FRA. CLEMEN 
MARIE; ANDREW JACOBS a/k/a 
BRO. MARY FIDELIS; TERRY HORWAT; 
a/k/a BRO. MARY MATHIAS; JOSEPH 
BELZAK a/k/a BRO. JOHN FRANCIS 
MARIE; and OUR LADY OF 
MARIENFRIED CATHOI ir 
Defendants. 
-'.ZZ^zJjte/ 
. the State c 
na,5 ::eer- riled in t-v Judioiai Distr,V+ f\-
jnt> of Spokane jurisdiction 
Judgment has the same legal force and effect as a Judgment rendered by the Utah 
State Court. 
DATED this ! ( / ? day of June, 1987. 
HANSEN <5c ANDERSON 
SJohn T. Anderso 
Jamie J. Swenson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3M0-V_.. 
Judgment Creditor: 
The Corporation of the Tridentine 
Latin Rite Catholic Church 
of Saint Joseph 
c/o Father Louis M. Kerfoot 
North 8500 Street, Michael Road 
Post Office Box 6324 
Spokane, Washington 99207 
Judgment Creditor's Attorneys: 
John T. Anderson 
Jamie J. Swenson 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Valley Bank Tower, Sixth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-2-
GCOCilc 
/ , CERTiy&TIONpFfiERVICE BY MAILING 
_ _ _ _ _ L _ _ /v ^ T o e i n g first duly swo ates 
e Judgment 
if»Dtor r^an^o b e r n ^ ^ ^ r . - 'iiifornia 95934; M eh^ 1 
Mangos J ; 
GorDet .1 . i- »ju» .1 - ' •>— *jscei , Mills, 
f
 i, fornia 95934, *.<id . ar Boridii * * ,.onurjr.:> - ^ \ + -*»soe t Mills, 
" i l *•' *-"'a H - - .* jent 
i > - , *« . *j AuSCit i ^ e sient * i -ir < * 85, 
- ^oen t M , California 95934; Andrew Jacobs ^ k a H* M." ! ^ delis at Box 
/j«i-^ i . * a .** i4; Jo&epn beizak a/k/a Bro. c ]\ rancis 
Maive at BOY 35, r r e seen t ML'1 i*ifnrma °n^34 .1 • , - M^« --"fried 
c i^r.o. « ^ day 
o f
 'Jvti/t • • " • 
ft/a^ 
Deputy Clerk 
-3. 
ADDENDUM FIVE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH AND/OR VACATE 
JUDGMENT, MOTION TO STAY 
ROBERT L. LORD 
Utah State Bar No. 1994 
Attorney for Defendants 
320 South 300 East, Suite 4A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4241 
JUL la 3 si W'Hi 
IN THE DBTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DCSTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
THE CORPORATION OF THE 
TRIDENTINE LATIN RITE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH OF SAINT JOSEPH, 
a Washington corporation, 
. . . Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTION TO QUASH and/or 
VACATE JUDGMENT, 
MOTION TO STAY 
Civil No. 276-3839 
FRANCIS SCHUCKARDT, et. al., 
. . . Defendants. 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
Come now the above named defendants, appearing specially and for the 
purpose of this motion only, and move the Court as follows: 
1. For an order quashing the purported Notice of Judgment in the 
above styled and numbered cause dated and mailed on or about June 16, 1987. 
2. For an order vacating and setting aside the foreign (Washington 
State) judgment filed in this matter. 
3. For an order staying enforcement of the said foreign judgment until 
further order of the court. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court shall deem appropri-
ate in the premises. 
This motion is based upon the following grounds and reasons: 
1. Service of process in the Washington State action was never validly 
effected upon these defendants. 
2. The Washington State Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants. 
3. Notice of judgment in this action was mailed to defendants at Box 
85, Crescent Mills, California, 95934. Defendants (or some of them) actually 
resided on Penninsula Drive, Lake Almanor, near Chester, Plumas County, Cali-
fornia, 
4. None of the defendants named herein have been properly notified of 
the entry of the foreign judgment in this action as required by 78-22a-l, et. seq., 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
5. Defendant, Our Lady of Marienfried Catholic Church, is not a 
defendant in the Washington State action, and is wrongfully and gratuitously named 
herein in order to levy upon certain monies belonging to the said Marienfried 
Catholic Church at the Brighton Bank, North Temple Branch, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
6. Plaintiffs have elected to proceed with a summons and complaint in 
this court (case #C87-4047) based upon the same foreign (Washington State) 
judgment and cannot legally prosecute both law suits based upon the identical 
cause of action. 
None of the defendants are residents of the State of Utah, counsel has 
conferred with only a few of them and has not had an opportunity to prepare 
affidavits or memoranda in support of this motion. Defendants reserve the right, 
therefor, to supplement this motion with affidavits and supporting memoranda 
hereafter. 
DATED July 15, 1987. 
Robert iL Lord 
Attorney for Defendants 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, 
this date of July 15, 1987, to John T. Anderson, attorney for plaintiffs, HANSON & 
ANDERSON, 50 West Broadway, Suite 600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
M^f f f l , / ^ X$hr£^ 
Robert L. Lord 
2 
ADDENDUM SIX 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE TESTIMONY 
OF CHARLES ELLIS 
92 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. ELLIS, COME FORWARD AND BE SWORN. 
CHARLES ELLIS 
CALLED AS A WITNESS HEREIN, HAVING BEEN DULY 
SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ANDERSON: 
Q. WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD, 
PLEASE? 
A. CHARLES ELLIS. 
Q. AND WHERE DO YOU RESIDE? 
A. MY BUSINESS ADDRESS IS WEST 1100 MALLA; 
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON. 
Q. ARE YOU EMPLOYED AT THE PRESENT TIME? 
A. YES, I AM. 
Q. BY WHOM? 
A. SPOKANE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT. 
Q. FOR HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED BY 
DEPARTMENT? 
A. IT WILL BE TEN YEARS THIS NOVEMBER. 
Q. AND WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT POSITION WITH 
POLICE DEPARTMENT? 
A. I'M A UNIFORM PATROL OFFICER, ASSIGNED 
THAT 
THAT 
TO THE 
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PATROL DIVISION. 
2 1 Q. AND WHAT POSITION DID YOU OCCUPY WITH THE 
3 I DEPARTMENT IN JUNE OF 1984? 
A. I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE CIVIL WARRANTS DIVISION 
OF THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT. 
6 1 Q. WHAT WERE YOUR GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN THAT 
7 POSITION? 
8 A. I WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERVING CIVIL PAPERS, 
9 SUBPOENAS, ANY TYPE OF COURT ORDERS THAT CAME TO OUR OFFICE 
10 FROM THE COURTS, AND OCCASIONALLY ASSISTED ON SHERIFF SALES 
11 OR CONFISCATIONS, CIVIL PROCESS LIKE THAT. 
12 Q. HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN IN THE LAW 
13 ENFORCEMENT BUSINESS? 
14 A. ABOUT 18 YEARS. 
15 Q. BEGINNING WHERE? 
16 A. VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA. T WAS A POLICE 
17 OFFICER THERE FOR EIGHT YEARS. LAST TWO YEARS BEFORE I 
18 LEFT, I WAS A DETECTIVE, TWO YEARS BEFORE THAT I WAS A 
19 PATROLMAN. 
20 Q. AND FOR HOW MANY YEARS DID YOU SERVE IN THE 
21 SPOKANE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, CIVIL DIVISION FOR THE 
22 PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS? 
23 A. ABOUT FOUR YEARS. 
24 Q. WERE YOU ON DUTY ON — DURING THE DAY OF JUNE 
25 8, 1984? 
10 
11 
12 
13 BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE MARKED EXHIBIT 1? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. AND DO YOU RECALL BEING ENTRUSTED WITH ANY 
PAPERS IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT WE'VE CALLED TODAY THE 
WASHINGTON ACTION? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND I'LL SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AND 
HERETOFORE INTRODUCED AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1, AND ASK 
WHETHER THE DOCUMENTS THAT ARE REFLECTED ABOUT ONE-FOURTH 
OF THE WAY DOWN THE PAGE ARE THE DOCUMENTS WITH WHICH YOU 
WERE ENTRUSTED? 
A. YES, THEY ARE. 
Q. IS YOUR SIGNATURE STAMPED AND AFFIXED TO THE 
A. YES, IT IS. 
Q. DID YOU HAVE THAT AFFIXED ON OR ABOUT JUNE 8, 
1984? 
A. THERE OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WHEN IT WAS TYPED 
UP BY ONE OF THE SECRETARIES IN THE OFFICE. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. DO YOU RECALL RECEIVING ANY 
INSTRUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SERVING THE VARIOUS PAPERS 
WITH WHICH YOU WERE ENTRUSTED? 
A. YES. I WAS NOTIFIED BY MY OFFICE TO GO TO 
EAST 2314 SOUTH ALTAMONT IN THE CITY OF SPOKANE, 
WASHINGTON, TO AFFECT THE SERVICE OF THE PAPERS. I DON'T 
REMEMBER THE EXACT PROBLEM, BUT THERE WAS SOME DISPUTE 
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BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE OR INJURY. 
2 I AND FOR THE OFFICERS' SAFETY, AND THE SAFETY OF THE 
3 OFFICERS INVOLVED, I WENT WITH A UNIFORMED CITY POLICE 
4 I OFFICER TO THAT RESIDENCE ALONG WITH THE TWO OTHER CHURCH 
OFFICIALS. 
6 1 Q. WHEN YOU SAY UNIFORMED POLICE OFFICERS, DO YOU 
7 I KNOW WITH WHICH DEPARTMENT THAT POLICE OFFICER WAS 
AFFILIATED? 
9 I A. THE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
10 Q. SPOKANE CITY? 
11 A. YES. 
12 Q. DO YOU RECALL THAT OFFICER'S NAME? 
13 A. I BELIEVE IT WAS OFFICER BURHEIL, I BELIEVE, 
14 B-U-R-H-E-I-L. I COULD BE WRONG ABOUT THE SPELLING. 
15 Q. IS IT YOUR RECOLLECTION THAT HE WAS IN FULL 
16 POLICE UNIFORM ON THAT DAY? 
17 A. YES, HE WAS IN FULL UNIFORM. 
18 Q. AND HE ACCOMPANIED YOU TO THE ADDRESS THAT 
19 YOU'VE INDICATED? 
20 A. YES. 
21 Q. AND IS THAT ADDRESS ALSO KNOWN AS THE PRIORY? 
22 A. I'VE HEARD IT HERE IN TESTIMONY, BUT IF THAT'S 
23 WHAT IT WAS I DON'T KNOW, BUT THE ADDRESS WAS THE ONE I 
24 ALREADY MENTIONED. 
25 Q. AND IN ADDITION TO THIS UNIFORMED POLICE 
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OFFICER, DID ANYONE ELSE ACCOMPANY YOU FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
SERVING THE PAPERS? 
A. YES, THE TWO CHURCH OFFICIALS HERE IN COURT. 
4 1 Q. AND WOULD YOU POINT TO THOSE GENTLEMEN? 
5| A. ONE IS THE GENTLEMEN IN THE BACK ROW WITH THE 
RED TIE AND BLUE SUIT. AND THE OTHER IS THE FATHER HERE 
SITTING ON THE END HERE IN THE CHURCH ATTIRE. 
MR. ANDERSON: MAY THE RECORD INDICATE THAT THE 
OFFICER HAS IDENTIFIED THOMAS DRAHMAN AND FATHER PIVARUNAS. 
10 I MR. LORD: IT MAY. 
11 Q. (BY MR. ANDERSON) DEPUTY ELLIS, WHEN YOU 
12 TYPICALLY SERVE PAPERS IN A CIVIL CASE, ARE YOU ROUTINELY 
13 ACCOMPANIED BY ARMED OFFICERS OF A POLICE FORCE? 
14 A. NO. 
15 Q. IS THAT FAIRLY UNUSUAL? 
16 A. YES, UNLESS WE FEEL THAT THERE'S SOME POTENTIAL 
17 FOR A PROBLEM OF SAFETY IN NUMBERS, THEN WE HAVE AN OFFICER 
18 OR TWO THAT WOULD ACCOMPANY, WHATEVER WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. 
19 Q. AND YOU HAD THAT APPREHENSION IN THIS CASE? 
20 A. YES, SIR. 
21 Q. AND THAT'S THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE OFFICER 
22 ACCOMPANIED YOU? 
23 A. YES. 
24 Q. DO YOU RECALL ARRIVING AT 2314 ALTAMONT DRIVE? 
25 A. YES. 
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1 Q. ON JUNE 8TH, 1984? 
2 A. YES. 
3 Q. DO YOU RECALL APPROXIMATELY WHAT TIME? 
4 A. 6:10 P.M. 
5 Q. AND DO YOU KNOW THAT TO BE A FACT BY VIRTUE OF 
6 THE FACT THAT'S REFLECTED ON YOUR RETURN OF SERVICE MARKED 
7 EXHIBIT 1? 
8 A. YES. 
9 Q. WOULD YOU TELL THE COURT IN YOUR OWN WORDS WHAT 
10 YOU DID WHEN YOU GOT OUT OF YOUR VEHICLE AT THAT TIME? 
11 A. WE WALKED UP TO THE DRIVEWAY OF THE RESIDENCE. 
12 IT WAS BACK OFF THE ROADWAY. IT'S ON SOME ACREAGE THERE. 
13 WE WALKED UP, THE FOUR OF US, AND WE WERE COMING AROUND THE 
14 CORNER TO THE BACK PART OF THE HOUSE WHERE WE WERE IN PLAIN 
15 VIEW, THE UNIFORMED OFFICER WAS WITH ME AS WELL AS THE TWO 
16 OTHER CHURCH OFFICIALS. THERE WERE PEOPLE MOVING AROUND. 
17 THERE WAS A VEHICLE IN THE BACK PART OF THE HOUSE, A RENTAL 
18 TRUCK OR SOME TYPE OF TRUCK VEHICLE, AND PEOPLE MOVING TO 
19 AND FROM THAT. AS WE APPROACHED TO THE HOUSE, THE FATHER 
20 MENTIONED THERE WAS ONE OF THE SUBJECTS THERE, TERRY 
21 HORWATH. 
22 THEN WE WENT UP TO THE FRONT PORCH WHERE I 
23 CONFRONTED THEM AT THE FRONT PORCH. AND THERE WERE PEOPLE 
24 STANDING AROUND THE INSIDE OF THE DOOR WHEN THE DOOR WAS 
25 OPENED. I IDENTIFIED MYSELF TO THEM AS A DEPUTY SHERIFF, 
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AND ALSO SHOWED MY BADGE, MY CASE BADGE I CARRY IN MY 
POCKET WHICH CONTAINS MY BADGE AND MY ID CARD; THAT I WAS 
THERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING CIVIL PAPERS. AND TERRY 
HORWATH WAS POINTED OUT AND SOME WORDS WERE EXCHANGED. 
PEOPLE CONVERSED BACK WITH ME. I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT 
THEY WERE SAYING. IT WAS ARGUMENTATIVE. THEY WERE UPSET. 
7 I WORDS WERE EXCHANGED, AND I LEFT THE PAPERS AND WALKED 
8 AWAY. 
9 Q. WHEN YOU SAY YOU LEFT THE PAPERS, DID YOU 
10 PHYSICALLY GIVE THEM TO MR. HORWATH? 
11 A. NO, THE PEOPLE WHO WERE AT THE DOOR. I FELT 
12 THERE WAS NO REASON FOR ME TO STAND THERE AND ARGUE WITH 
13 THEM OR CONVERSE WITH ANYONE. I STATED MY PURPOSE FOR 
14 BEING THERE, MY IDENTITY FOR BEING THERE. AND ONE OF THE 
15 PARTIES INVOLVED WERE IDENTIFIED TO ME BY FATHER PIVARUNAS. 
16 I DROPPED THE PAPER WHEN HE SHUT THE DOOR. I DROPPED THE 
17 PAPERS ON THE PORCH OR STOOP AND WALKED AWAY. 
18 Q. AT WHAT POINT WAS THE DOOR CLOSED ON YOU; WAS 
19 IT AFTER YOU HAD IDENTIFIED WHO YOU WERE? 
20 A. YES. 
21 Q. AND THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH YOU WERE THERE? 
22 A. BECAUSE THEY MADE SEVERAL COMMENTS BACK TO ME 
23 WITH REGARDS TO HAVING A RIGHT TO BE THERE, AND NOT HAVING 
24 A WARRANT. I DON'T REMEMBER THE EXACT WORDS, BUT THEY WERE 
25 CHALLENGING ME WHY I WAS THERE AND THE RIGHT BEING THERE. 
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1 Q. DID YOU SEEK TO TENDER THE PAPERS TO THEM? 
2 A. I HAD THE PAPERS OUT AND THEY SHUT THE DOOR, 
3 SLAMMED THE DOOR. I LEFT THE PAPERS AND THAT WAS THE END. 
4 Q. WAS THERE ANY POINT DURING THIS ENCOUNTER THAT 
5 YOUR FOOT WAS ACTUALLY PHYSICALLY INSIDE THE DOOR? 
6 A. IT WAS REFRESHED TO ME SINCE I'VE BEEN HERE 
7 THAT THAT DID HAPPEN, AND I BELIEVE THAT DID HAPPEN. 
8 Q. AND WERE YOU ASKED TO REMOVE YOUR FOOT FROM THE 
9 DOOR? 
10 A. I BELIEVE I WAS, YES. 
11 Q. AND WAS IT AT THAT POINT THE DOOR WAS CLOSED ON 
12 YOU? 
13 A. I FINISHED SAYING WHAT I HAD TO SAY, AND 1 WAS 
14 DONE WITH THE FIRST PART OF MY JOB OF IDENTIFYING MYSELF 
15 AND MY REASON, PURPOSE FOR BEING THERE, AT WHICH TIME I 
16 REMOVED MY FOOT AND HE CLOSED THE DOOR. 
17 Q. COULD YOU CHARACTERIZE FOR THE COURT HOW 
18 ABRUPTLY OR HOW SLOWLY THE DOOR WAS CLOSED? 
19 A. IT WAS DONE QUICKLY. I DON'T HAVE ANY 
20 RECOLLECTION IF IT WAS CLOSED IN A NORMAL FASHION LIKE WHEN 
21 YOU'RE FINISH CONDUCTING BUSINESS WITH SOMEONE AT THE DOOR 
22 AND THEY SAY GOOD-BYE. IT WASN'T DONE LIKE THAT, BUT THE 
23 PARTICULARS OF IT, NO. 
24 Q. . WAS IT CLEAR TO YOU AT THAT TIME THAT MR. 
25 HORWATH WASN'T INTERESTED IN TALKING TO YOU FURTHER? 
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A. RIGHT. 
2 1 Q. WAS II AI THAT I'OINI IIIA1 YOU LEFT THE PAPERS 
3 I ON THE FRONT DOORSTEP? 
A. YES. I WASN'T GOING TO STAY THERE FOR MY 
SAFETY AND THE SAFETY OF THE OTHERS, TO TRY AND IDENTIFY 
THE OTHER NINE PEOPLE THAT WERE ON THE LIST OR ANYTHING 
LIKE THAT. 
0. AND WHERE ON THE DOORSTEP DID YOU LEAVE THE 
PAPERS? 
10 I A. JUST WHERE I WAS STANDING. 
11 Q. THE BASE OF THE DOOR? 
12 A. I DON'T KNOW TF THERE WERE STEPS GOING UP TO 
13 THE HOUSE, OR IF THERE WERE THREE OR FOUR STEPS LEADING UP 
14 TO THE ACTUAL DOORWAY, OR IF I WAS AT GROUND LEVEL OR A 
15 FOOT OFF OR JUST AT THE DOOR. 
16 0. DID YOU TRY TO TALK THROUGH THE DOOR TO 
17 EXPLAIN? 
18 A AFTER THEY CLOSED THE DOOR, I FINISHED 
19 ANNOUNCING MY INTENTION AND PURPOSE, AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN 
20 SERVED, IN A VOICE AUDIBLE THAT PEOPLE AROUND ME WOULD BE 
21 ABLE TO HEAR. 
22 0. DTD YOU RECEIVE ANY RESPONSE FROM WITHIN THE 
23 BUILDING? 
24 A. NO. 
25 U. AND THEN AT THAT POINT YOU LEFT? 
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A. MY TASK WAS COMPLETED SO I LEFT. 
2 1 Q. SO YOU WERE ONLY ABLE TO EFFECT PERSONAL 
3 SERVICE OF PROCESS ON ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS; IS THAT 
4 I CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
6 1 Q. AND THAT WAS BASED ON THE IDENTIFICATION MADE 
7 I TO YOU BY FATHER PIVARUNAS? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND COULD YOU TELL THE COURT WHY YOU WERE 
10 I RELUCTANT TO EFFECT SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON THE OTHER NINE 
11 DEFENDANTS? 
12 A. LIKE I SAY, I WASN'T THERE TO IDENTIFY EVERY 
13 PERSON. I HAD DONE ONE PERSON, AND I NEEDED THROUGH MY 
14 OFFICE — THEY HAD GIVEN ME THE OKAY TO DO SUBSTITUTE 
15 SERVICE ON THE OTHER PARTIES INVOLVED AND THEY WANTED TO 
16 GET THEM SERVED, AS WE ROUTINELY DO. AND WE MAY BE 
17 NOTIFIED FROM THE ATTORNEYS, WHOEVER SENDS US PAPERS, THEY 
18 TELL US TO DO SUBSTITUTE SERVICE OR PERSONAL SERVICE, AND 
19 WE WILL DO THAT. THIS IS THE REASON WE DID THE SUBSTITUTE 
20 SERVICE AFTER DOING ONE PERSONAL SERVICE. 
21 Q. DID YOUR APPREHENSION ABOUT YOUR PHYSICAL 
22 SAFETY INFLUENCE YOUR DECISION TO IN FACT DO SUBSTITUTE 
23 SERVICE? 
24 A. WITH THE ATMOSPHERE AND WHAT WAS GOING ON, AND 
25 THE CONFUSION WITH WHAT THEY WERE ARGUING ABOUT, I WASN'T 
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GOING TO STAY THERE AND DEBATE THE ISSUE WITH THEM. 
2 1 Q. AND YOU LEFT THE PROPERTY? 
3 A. YES. 
4 Q. IN YOUR 14 YEARS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERIENCE, 
5 I DID YOU EVER TESTIFY BEFORE ABOUT THE EFFICIENCY OF PROCESS 
THAT JE SERVED? 
A. NO. 
8 1 Q. HAS ANYONE EVER MADE A CLAIM THAT YOUR SERVICE 
9 WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR ANY REASON? 
10 A. NO. 
11 MR. ANDERSON: THANK YOU, NOTHING FURTHER, 
12 I THE COURT: MR. LORD? 
13 
14 I CROSS-EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. LORD: 
16 Q. DEPUTY ELLIS, I BELIEVE ONE OF THE PARAGRAPHS 
17 IN THE RETURN THAT YOU SIGNED, STATES THAT AFTER DILIGENT 
18 SEARCH AND INQUIRY YOU WERE UNABLE TO DEFINE THE 
19 DEFENDANTS; THEREFORE, YOU EFFECTED SERVICE BY THE 
20 SUBSTITUTE SERVICE, BY SERVING IT ON FRATER MATHIAS OR 
21 TERRY HORWATH AS YOU HAD IDENTIFIED THEM. 
22 WHAT DID YOU DO TO DILIGENTLY SEARCH AND 
23 INQUIRE ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE OTHER DEFENDANTS? 
24 A. WHEN WE RECEIVE CIVIL PAPERS IT IS UP TO THE 
25 PARTIES BRINGING THE PAPERS TO US TO GIVE US AN ADDRESS OR 
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1 WORK ADDRESS OR PLACE WHERE THEY MAY BE FOUND. THIS 
2 ADDRESS WAS GIVEN TO ME AS LISTED ON OUR DAY SHEET. THAT 
3 WAS THE ADDRESS I WENT TO. THE PARTIES WERE THERE. AS I 
4 LEARNED LATER, WITH THE PROBLEMS THAT WAS THERE IT WASN'T 
5 BENEFICIAL FOR ME TO REQUIRE ID OF EVERY PERSON, OR 
6 WHATEVER, WHICH IN A CIVIL CASE WE CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO 
7 MAKE A PERSON SHOW THEIR ID. 
8 Q. I THINK MY QUESTION IS WHAT DID YOU DO. 
9 A. TO GO TO THAT RESIDENCE AND THAT WAS ALL. 
10 Q. YOU DIDN'T ATTEMPT IN ANY WAY THEN TO FIND OUT 
11 WHO ACTUALLY RESIDED OR LIVED AT THAT LOCATION? 
12 A. I DID NOT, NO. THE PAPERS WERE RETURNED BACK 
13 TO OUR OFFICE WHERE THE RETURNS OF SERVICE WERE MADE. THEY 
14 NEEDED TO GO BACK IN. I BELIEVE THEY WERE COURT DATED 
15 PAPERS. 
16 Q. THE RETURNS OF SERVICE WERE MADE PURSUANT TO 
17 YOUR DIRECTIONS AS TO WHAT YOU HAD DONE, WERE THEY NOT? 
18 A. YES. 
19 Q. SO YOU RECEIVED THE PAPERS APPROXIMATELY WHAT 
20 TIME DURING THE DAY? 
21 A. I DON'T KNOW; THAT DAY, THAT AFTERNOON, MAYBE. 
22 Q. AND YOU WENT TO THE ALTAMONT RESIDENCE; YOU 
23 DIDN'T GO ANYWHERE ELSE BEFORE THAT? 
24 A. THERE WAS AN ADDRESS OF CAVANAUGH'S INTERPARK, 
25 WHICH WAS A MOTEL THAT I WENT TO. 
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0 AND WHAT WAS THF PURPOSE FOR GOING THERE? 
A. MY OFFICER TOLD ME THAT HE MAY BE STAYING 
THERE. 
4 1 Q. WOULD MAY BE STAYING THERE? 
5 A. FATHER MATHIAS OK FATHER SCHUCKARDT. 
6 Q. BISHOP SCHUCKARDT? 
7 A. YES. 
8 Q. WHO TOLD YOU HE MAY BE STAYING THERE? 
9 A. OUR OFFICE. I WORK IN THE PATROL CAR. I HAVE 
10 A RADIO, AND OUR OFFICE GOES THROUGH OUR DISPATCH TO GIVE 
11 MF MESSAGES OK WHATEVER. T HAVE MY PAPERS IN THE MORNING 
12 OR THE EVENING SHIFT OR WHATEVER SHIFT I'M WORKING, I TAKE 
13 Mi PAPERS AND GO OUT ON THE STREET. T DON'T COME BACK INTO 
14 THE OFFICE ALL DAY, UNLESS THEY CALL ME BACK IN. THEY MAY 
15 HAVE CALLED ME AND TOLD ME HE WAS THERE. I DON'T KNOW. 
16 Q. WHAT DID YOU FIND WHEN YOU WNT TO THE MOTEL? 
17 A. HE WAS NOT THERE. 
18 Q. DID YOU MAKE ANY OTHER ATTEMPT TO LOCATE ANY 
19 OTHER DEFENDANT OTHER THAN TO JUST GO TO THE ALTAMONT 
20 RESIDENCE? ' 
21 A. NO. 
22 Q. IF THERE HAD BEEN 25 OTHER DEFENDANTS NAMED IN 
23 THAT LAWSUIT, WOULD YOU HAVE MADE THE SAME TYPE OF A 
24 RETURN, SAYING YOU SERVED THOSE OTHER 25? 
25 MR. ANDERSON: OBJECTION, IT'S HYPOTHETICAL AND 
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SPECULATIVE. 
2 1 MR. LORD: I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT HIS 
3 THINKING IS, YOUR HONOR, ABOUT WHO HE SERVES AND HOW HE 
4 I ACCOMPLISHES THAT. 
THE COURT: I'LL SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION. 
6 1 Q. (BY MR. LORD) OKAY. DID YOU HAVE ANY 
7 I KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR OWN AS TO WHETHER ANY OF THE DEFENDANTS 
NAMED ACTUALLY LIVED AT THAT RESIDENCE? 
A. NO. 
10 I Q. WHAT DID YOU RELY ON? 
11 A. THE PEOPLE THAT SENT THE PAPERS TO OUR OFFICE. 
12 Q. THE PLAINTIFFS THEMSELVES? 
13 A. THEY SUPPLIED US WITH AN ADDRESS, AND WITH THAT 
14 INFORMATION THEY GIVE IT TO US AND WE GO WITH THE 
15 INFORMATION THAT'S GIVEN TO US. 
16 Q. LITERALLY, WHAT INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO YOU? 
17 A. THE INFORMATION I HAD WAS TYPED UP BY OUR 
18 OFFICE ON MY LOG, THE PEOPLE AND THE ADDRESS THERE ON EAST 
19 2314 SOUTH ALTAMONT, SPOKANE. 
20 Q. WHAT INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO YOU? 
21 A. ON OUR DAY SHEET, IT IS — ON THE HEADING OF 
22 IT, IT'S CALLED THE SHERIFF'S DAY LOG. 
23 Q. DO YOU HAVE THAT WITH YOU? 
24 A. NO, I DO NOT HAVE IT HERE. IT LISTED THE 
25 PARTIES INVOLVED AND LISTS THE COURT DATES, THE TYPE OF 
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PAPERS THEY ARE, SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, WHATEVER. THERE'S 
NUMEROUS TYPfcIS OF CIVIL PAPKRK THAT I SERVE. AND TMR 
BOTTOM PART AND THE BACK, IF NEED BE, WILL LIST THE PERSON 
AND HTS ADDRESS. SO WE'LL MAKF OUR NOTES ON THAT DAY LOG 
AND THAT'S IN THE RETURN OF SERVICES TYPED UP. 
6 1 Q. AND HOW WERE THE DEFENDANTS LISTED ON THAT DAY 
7 LOG? 
8 1 A. BY THEIR NAME AND ADDRESS. 
9 Q. DID THEY ALL HAVE THE SAME ADDRESS? 
10 A. YES. 
11 Q. DID YOU MAKE ANY ATTEMPT TO VERIFY WHETHER ANY 
12 OF THEM l.rVEI'l AT THAT ADDRESS? 
13 A. NO. 
14 Q. DID YOU SEE ANY DEFENDANTS OTHER THAN TERRY 
15 HORWATH OR FRATER MATHIAS, THE SAME INDIVIDUAL HERE; DID 
16 YOU Sll ANY OTHER PEOPLE THERE THAT YOU COULD IDENTIFY AS A 
17 DEFENDANT IN THIS ACTION? 
18 A. NO. 
19 Q. WAS ANYONE ELSE POINTED OUT TO YOU AS BEING A 
20 DEFENDANT IN THE ACTION? 
21 A. HE WAS THE ONLY ONE THAT WAS POINTED OUT. 
22 Q. CAN YOU DESCRIBE TERRY HORWATH? 
23 A. NO. 
24 Q. DID HE IDENTIFY HIMSELF TO YOU AS BEING TERRY 
25 HORWATH OR FRATER MATHIAS? 
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A. I DON'T BELIEVE SO, NO. 
Q. TELL ME THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH HE WAS 
IDENTIFIED; WHERE WERE YOU AND WHERE WERE THE OTHER PEOPLE 
AROUND YOU AND WHERE WAS FRATER MATHIAS AND THE OTHER 
INDIVIDUALS AND HOW DID YOU IDENTIFY WHICH ONE WAS FRATER 
MATHIAS? 
A. AS WE WERE WALKING UP AND AROUND TO THE CORNER, 
WE WERE IN AN AREA AS BIG AS THIS COURTROOM, TO MY LEFT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN A VEHICLE, RENTAL TRUCK OR WHATEVER, THERE. 
TO MY RIGHT WAS THE ACTUAL HOUSE, STRUCTURE OF THE HOUSE. 
THERE WAS A BACK DOOR, AND THERE WAS A DRIVEWAY, LITTLE 
FLOWERS AROUND OR WHATEVER. THEY WERE BETWEEN THE VEHICLE 
AND THE RESIDENCE, MOVING BACK AND FORTH. THEY COULD 
ACTUALLY SEE US AS WE ROUNDED THE CORNER. WE WERE WITHIN A 
CLOSE PROXIMITY. HE POINTED OUT WHO TERRY WAS. THEY WENT 
UP TO THE DOOR AND THEY WENT UP TO THE HOUSE AT THE DOOR. 
I CONVERSED WITH THEM AND IDENTIFIED MYSELF AND MY PURPOSE. 
Q. OKAY. WAS MR. HORWATH OR FRATER MATHIAS, WAS 
HE ISOLATED AND BY HIMSELF WHEN HE WAS POINTED OUT OR WAS 
HE WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP? 
A. THEY WERE ALL IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA. 
WHETHER HE WAS STANDING OFF ALONE OR NOT, I DON'T REMEMBER. 
Q. HOW WERE YOU ABLE TO DISTINGUISH WHICH 
INDIVIDUAL IT WAS THAT MR. PIVARUNAS WAS IDENTIFYING AS 
25 TERRY HORWATH? 
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1 A. HE POINTED HIM OUT TO ME, AND WHEN WE WENT UP 
2 TO THE STEPS HE WAS THERE AT THE DOOR. HE NEVER 
3 ACKNOWLEDGED TO ME — 
4 Q. DID HE SAY: HE'S THE THIRD MAN FROM THE RIGHT, 
5 OR HE'S THE ONE IN THE MIDDLE, HE'S THE SHORT ONE, OR HE'S 
6 THE ONE WITH THE MOUSTACHE, OH HOW COUI.D Yull TELl. WHICH 
7 INDIVIDUAL HE HAD REFERENCED TO? 
8 A. HE WAS IN THAT G R O W OP PEOPLE THAT WERE AT THE 
9 DOOR. 
10 Q. SO IT COULD HAVE BEEN AN YON HI OF' THE GROUP OF 
11 PEOPLE THAT WAS TERRY HORWATH? 
12 A. YES. 
13 Q. SO WHAT YOD KNOW FOR SURE THEN, IS THAT YOU 
14 T- • .v-. . . AT THE DOOR? 
15 SEVERAL PEOPLE, YES. 
16 Q. HAT GROUP OF PEOPLE WAS ONE OF THE 
17 INDIVIDUALS THAT WAS POINTED OUT AS TERRY HORWATH? 
18 A. YES. 
19 Q. BUT YOU DON'T KNOW WHICH ONE IT WAS? 
20 A. NO. 
21 Q. COULD YOU DESCRIBE FOR ME THE CONVERSATION, 
22 TELL ME THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONVERSATION YOU HAD AT THE 
23 DOOR? 
24 A. I DON'T REMEMBER EXACTLY. I WENT UP, AND AS I 
25 ROUTINELY DO I IDENTIFIED MYSELF AS A DEPUTY SHERIFF, HAD 
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1 MY BADGE AND MY ID CARD, WHICH I HELD IN THIS HAND. 
2 Q. WHEN YOU IDENTIFIED YOURSELF, WHAT DID YOU SAY? 
3 A. "I'M A DEPUTY SHERIFF. I HAVE SOME CIVIL 
4 PAPERS WITH REGARDS TO THE MOUNT ST. MICHAEL'S", OR WORDS 
5 TO THAT EFFECT. I DON'T READ THE PAPERS VERBATIM. I DON'T 
6 GO OVER THE PAPERS WITH THEM. FOR OFFICER'S SAFETY, I'M 
7 NOT GOING TO STAND THERE HOLDING A STACK OF PAPERS AND HAVE 
8 SOMEBODY PUNCH ME OUT OR DRAW DOWN ON ME WITH A GUN. 
9 Q. IS THAT SOMETHING YOU NORMALLY EXPECT WHEN YOU 
10 ARE OUT SERVING PAPERS, SOMEONE IS GOING TO DRAW DOWN ON 
11 YOU WITH A GUN? 
12 A. ANY POTENTIAL LIKE THAT CAN HAPPEN, YES. BEING 
13 A DEPUTY SHERIFF, I DON'T KNOW WHAT THESE PEOPLE ARE 
14 THINKING. I STATE THE PURPOSE AND WHO I AM. 
15 Q. YOU SAID YOU HAD SOME PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE 
16 MOUNT ST. MICHAELS? 
17 A. SOME CIVIL PAPERS. I MAY HAVE READ OFF THE TOP 
18 OF THE PAPERS SOMETHING THAT WAS IN THE COMPLAINT. 
19 Q. YOU SAID YOU DID OR YOU MAY HAVE? 
20 A. MAY HAVE. 
21 Q. DO YOU KNOW IF YOU DID OR NOT? 
22 A. I TOLD HIM I HAD SOME CIVIL PAPERS. AND THAT'S 
23 WHAT I WOULD ROUTINELY DO WHEN I WENT TO SOMEBODY'S 
24 RESIDENCE OR WHATEVER, TO SERVE PAPERS, STATING MY PURPOSE 
25 FOR BEING THERE. 
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Q. WHAT DID YOU SAY YOUR PURPOSE WAS? TELL ME 
WHAT YOU SAID TO WHOEVER WAS AT THE DOOR WHEN YOU WERE 
TALKING TO THEM. 
A. I DON'T REMEMBER EXACTLY WHAT I SAID. I HID 
IDENTIFY MYSELF AS A POLICE OFFICER. 
Q. KATHRR THAN DESCRIRK rtHAT rOU ulli, TILL Ml- WHAT 
YOU SAID, IF YOU COULD. 
A. "DEPUTY ELLIS FROM THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE." I 
HAD MY BADGE EXPOSED WHERE THEY COULD SEE IT. "I HAVE SOME 
CIVIL PAPERS", AT WHICH TIME SOME WORDS WERE EXCHANGED. 
Q. WHAT WERE THE WORDS? 
A. I DON'T RECALL. THE PEOPLE AT THE DOOR WERE 
TALKING BACK AND FORTH. 
Q. BETWEEN THEMSELVES? 
A. THROUGH ME TO THEM, SOMETHING ABOUT A WARRANT, 
HAVING ANY RIGHT TO BE THERE. .«.s»T REMEMBER THE EXACT 
WORDING, OF WHAT WAS SAID EXACTLY, BUT I WAS ABLE TO STATE 
MY I'llRI'OSl,, LAWI'UL PURPOSE FOR BEING THERE. 
Q. YOU SAY THAT AFTER THE DOOR WAS CLOSED YOU 
ANNOUNCED YOUR PURPOSE, AT LEAST I THINK THAT'S WHAT YOU 
SAID ON DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
A. NO. I FINISHED WHAT I HAD TO SAY, THAT I WAS 
LEAVING THE PAPERS ON THE DOOR, THAT THEY HAD BEEN SERVED. 
Q. YOU SAID YOU DID THAT IN A VOICE AUDIBLE FOR 
THOSE AROUND YOU TO HEAR? 
Ill 
A. THE NORMAL TONE. 
Q. WHAT ABOUT THOSE THAT WERE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF 
DOOR, COULD THEY HEAR THAT? 
A. I DON'T KNOW IF THEY COULD HEAR THAT IN FACT OR 
NOT. 
MR. LORDS COULD I HAVE JUST A MOMENT WITH MY 
CLIENT, YOUR HONOR? 
THAT'S ALL I HAVE OF THE DEPUTY. 
THE COURT: ANY REDIRECT? 
MR. ANDERSON: JUST BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ANDERSON: 
Q. DEPUTY ELLIS, YOU INDICATED THAT APPARENTLY 
THERE WAS MORE THAN ONE INDIVIDUAL STANDING BEHIND THE 
DOOR, CORRECT? 
A. THEY WERE IN THE DOORWAY. THE DOOR WAS OPEN 
AND THEY WERE STANDING IN THE FOYER, I GUESS YOU WOULD CALL 
IT, THE THRESHOLD. 
Q. AND I BELIEVE YOU INDICATED IN RESPONSE TO MR. 
LORD'S QUESTION, THAT MR. HORWATH COULD HAVE BEEN ANY ONE 
OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. BUT WERE YOU RELYING ON WHAT FATHER PIVARUNAS 
TOLD YOU AS TO WHO MR. HORWATH WAS? 
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A. YES. 
2 1 Q. AND IS THAT THE BASIS UPON WHICH YOU BELIEVE 
3 I YOU SERVED THE PAPERS ON MR. HORWATH? 
A. YES. 
5 1 Q. AND THAT'S SO REFLECTED IN vntjp RETURN OF 
6 I SERVICE? 
A. YES. 
MR. ANDERSON: THANK YOU. 
MR. LORD T HAVE NO RECROSS. 
10 I THE COURr < ••-• TKP HOWN. 
11 MR. LORD, CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS. 
12 MR. ANDERSON: MAY THE WITNESS BE EXCUSED? 
13 THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION? 
14 MH. LORIl: I HAVH NO OBJECTION. 
15 WE CALL FRATER MATTHEW MARIE, ALSO IDENTIFIED 
16 IN THE PLEADINGS AS COURTNEY KRIER. 
17 
18 COURTNEY KRIER 
19 CALLED AS A WITNESS HEREIN, HAVING BEEN DULY 
20 SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
21 
22 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
23 BY MR. LORD: 
24 Q. WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME AND PRESENT ADDRESS, 
25 PLEASE? 
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ROBERT L. LORD 
Utah State Bar No. 1994 
Attorney for Third Party Claimant 
320 South 300 East, Suite 4A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4241 
Df THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
Otputy Ctork /tC 
THE CORPORATION OF THE 
TRIDENTINE LATIN RITE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH OF SAINT JOSEPH, 
a Washington corporation, 
. . . Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
FRANCIS SCHUCKARDT, et . al., 
. . . Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Foreign Judgment No. 276-3839 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
— o o o O o o o — 
The above entitled matter was before the Court on May 16 and 17, 
1988, for an evidentiary hearing on defendants1 motion to quash and/or vacate a 
foreign judgment on the grounds of improper service of process and lack of 
jurisdiction over the defendants. AU of the individual defendants (except for 
Vladimiar Boridin aka Bro. Longiuns, and Terry Horwath aka Fra. Mary Mathias and 
Our Lady of Marienfried Catholic Church), were presonally present in court, and all 
(except for Our Lady of Marienfried Catholic Church) were represented by their 
attorney, Robert L. Lord. Representatives of the plaintiff corporation were 
present in court and plaintiff was represented by its attorney, John T. Anderson. 
At the commencement of the trial, counsel for the defendants advised the court 
that they would waive their claims that notice of judgment in this action was not 
properly effected pursuant to the provisions of 78-22a-l, et. seq., Utah Code 
annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The Court, having heard, weighed and considered the evidence and 
testimony adduced, having reviewed the files and records herein, being fully 
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, hereby makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Additional 
Judgment were entered in the Superior Court of the State of Washington in and for 
the County of Spokane, Case #84201445-2, on October 15, 1984, against all of the 
named defendants (except the Marienfried Catholic Church) for the sum of 
$250,000 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date thereof until 
paid. 
2. An authenticated copy of the Washington judgment was filed herein 
on June 16, 1987. 
3. The Spokane County Sheriff's Return of Service recites service upon 
all defendants by delivering to and leaving a copy of the summons and complaint 
with the defendant Terry Horwath at the former residence of the defendant 
Schuckardt (known as the Priory) at East 2314 South Altamont Blvd., Spokane 
Washington, on the 8th day of June, 1984. 
4. The defendants Francis Schuckardt, Andrew Jacobs and Joseph 
Belzak were not domiciled at the Priory at the time of service. Even though those 
defendants had resided at the Priory before June 8, they had left the Priory before 
June 8, with the intention of leaving permanently and not returning, and they were 
not physically present at the Priory at the time service was made. 
5. The defendants Michael Mangold and Raymond Kosch were not full 
time residents of the Priory and had left the Priory before June 8, intending never 
to return and, indeed, did not return. They were not physically present at the 
Priory when the summons and complaint were served. 
6. Defendants Gabriel Gorbet and Terry Horwath were admittedly 
domiciled at the Priory up to June 8, and were, in fact, present at the Priory on 
June 8, when the summons and complaint were served. Even though there may 
have been some intention to leave, they had not left at the time of service and, 
accordingly, were still domiciled at the Priory. 
7. The defendant Courtney Krier claims not to have been domiciled at 
the Priory on June 8. However, he had overnight clothes at the Priory and spent a 
substantial amount of his time at the Priory. Living arrangements were rather 
2 
loose and flexible as between the Priory and Mount St. Michaels Seminary and 
defendant Krier could as easily have been deemed to be domiciled at the Priory as 
at Mount St. Michaels on June 8. In addition, defendant Krier, prior to June 8, had 
left Mount St. Michaels with the intention of staying at the Priory and not 
returning. 
8. Defendant Vladimiar Boridin was a resident of the Priory as of June 
8. 
y. Our Lady of Marienfried Catholic Church was not a named party on 
the Washington judgment. 
10. Notice of Judgment in this action was mailed to the defendants at 
Box 85, Crescent Mills, California 95934. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Notice of Judgment in this action was properly mailed to the 
defendants as required by 78-22a-a, eL seq.f Utah Code Annotated, 1953f HS 
amended, June 16, 1987. 
2. The service of summons and complaint upon defendant Terry 
Horwath at the Priory on June 8, 1984, was properly made by Deputy Sheriff 
Charles Ellis. Accordingly, those defendants domiciled at the Prior at the time of 
service were properly served. 
\ The defendants Francis Schuckardt, Andrew Jacobs, Joseph Belzak, 
Michael Mangold and Raymond Kosch were not residents of the Priory on June 8, 
1984, and their motion to quash, as to them, should be granted. 
4. Enforcement of the Washington State judgment should be perma-
nently stayed as to the defendants Schuckardt, Jacobs, Belzak, Mangold and Kosch. 
5. The defendants Gabriel Gorbet, Terry Horwath, Courtney Krier and 
Vladimiar Boridin were residents of the Priory on June 8, 1984, and their motion to 
quash should not be granted as to them. 
6. The motion to quash should be granted a&> to the defendant, Our 
Lady of Marienfried Catholic Church. 
7. Each party should bear his own costs and attorney fees incurred in 
this matter. 
3 
DATED this //iday of July, 1988. 
Approved as to Form: 
BY THE COURT: 
Frank~G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
:k±^ y'U.WL 
John"% Anderson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
I Clerk 
0«pwy Cl^k 
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ADDENDUM EIGHT 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (UTAH) 
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JUL 2 9 1988 
H. Dixon Hinu»Mv^C«w* 3r0 D«t, Court gt v. »w> 
ROBERT L. LORD 
Utah State Bar No. 1994 
Attorney for Third Party Claimant 
320 South 300 East, Suite 4A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4241 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
THE CORPORATION OF THE 
TRIDENTINE LATIN RITE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH OF SAINT JOSEPH, 
a Washington corporation, 
, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Deputy Clerk 
JUDGMENT & ORDER 
Foreign Judgment No. 276-3839 
Honorable Frai lk G Noel 
FRANCIS SCHUCKARDT, et. aL, 
. Defendants. 
—oooOooo— 
The above entitled matter was before the Court oi i May 16 ai id 11 , 
1988, for an evidentiary hearing on defendants1 motion to quash and/or vacate a 
foreign judgment on the grounds of improper service of process and lack of 
jurisdiction over the defendants. All of the individual defendants (except for 
Vladimiar Boridin aka Bro. Longiuns, Terry Horwath aka Fra. Mary Mathias, and 
Our Lady of Marienfried Catholic Church), were presonally present in court, and all 
(except for Our Lady of Marienfried Catholic Church) were represented by their 
attorney, Robert L. Lord. Representatives of the plaintiff corporation were 
present in court and plaintiff was represented by its attorney, John T. Anderson, 
The Court having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing, 
it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The defendants1 Motion to Quash as to defendants Schuckardt, 
Jacobs, Belzak, Mangold and Kosch be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. The 
Notice of Judgment, mailed on or about June 16, 1987, is hereby QUASHED an* :••«.-
Plaintiff enjoined from enforcement of the Washington State judgment in the State 
of Utah as against the said defendants. 
2. The defendants' Motion to Quash as to Our Lady of Marienfpied 
Catholic Church be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 
3. The defendant's Motion to Quash as to the defendants Gorbet, 
Hopwath, Krier and Boridin be, and the same hereby is DENIED. 
4. No costs OP attorney fees ape awarded to either the plaintiff OP the 
defendants herein. 
DATED this Jjl day of July, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
\&£1 
John TS Anderson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clerk 
By P f t l ^ W - Cteputy emu 
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ADDENIXM NINE 
TIME LINE 
Regular Residents of Priory: 
Shuckardt 
Jacobs 
Belzak 
Horwath 
Gorbet 
Regular Residents of 
St. Michaels Seminary: 
Mangold 
Kosch 1 
Krier 1 
Boridin i 
5/28 or 
5/29/84 
5/30/84 
5/31/84 
6/1/84 f -—-— Michael Mangold arrives for regular weekend duties. 
6/2/84 
6/3/84 
6/4/84 f 
i i l l i - MNI< 
Courtney Krier delivers messages and stays to take care of "pressing 
matters". 
,. Boridin arrives to ally himself with the Bishop. 
\ \ R a y m o n d Kosch arrives at 1:00 a.m. at plaintiffs' request to fix a 
stove. 
.Schuckhardt, Jacobs, Belzak and Horwath move to Jefferson House 
Hotel. 
f Jacobs, Belzak and Horwath return to assist in packing and moving. 
6/8/84 
6/9/84 
Mangold, Kosch and Boridin leave for ranch in California, 
Chicoine and Drahman attempt service of summons bv trickery n 
Jacobs and Horwath. 
Sheriffs purported service on Horwath. 
All defendants trucks and possessions gone from Priory. 
